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• We analyze gender effects in the lying behavior of groups and individuals.
• We extend the die-rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).
• There are no pronounced gender effects under individual decision-making.
• Strong gender effects emerge under joint decision-making in groups.
• There is more lying in male groups and mixed groups than in female groups.
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a b s t r a c t
Extending the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), we compare gender effects
with respect to unethical behavior by individuals and by two-person groups. In contrast to individual
decisions, gender matters strongly under group decisions. We find more lying in male groups and mixed
groups than in female groups.
© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Unethical behavior is a ubiquitous feature in many economic
contexts, and a number of recent experimental studies have
analyzed lying as one prominent type of unethical behavior. For
example, in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) individuals are
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0165-1765/© 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.asked to report the (privately observed) realization of a die roll that
determines their payoff. Evidence for lying (on the aggregate level)
is then obtained by comparing the actual payoff distribution with
the uniform distribution, which would result under truth-telling.
Other studies have analyzed lying using the sender–receiver setup
of Gneezy (2005). All in all, there is strong evidence for lying, but
often not to the maximal extent possible; suggesting that there
are private costs associated with such unethical behavior (Gneezy,
2005; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Erat and Gneezy, 2012;
Gibson et al., 2013).
With respect to gender differences, it seems that males are
somewhat more prone to lying than females, but often the effect
is small or not statistically significant (Dreber and Johannesson,
26 G. Muehlheusser et al. / Economics Letters 128 (2015) 25–292008; Childs, 2012; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Houser et al., 2012;
Conrads et al., 2013, 2014; Abeler et al., 2014).1
So far, the literature on lying behavior has mainly analyzed de-
cisions by individuals; possibly in strategic interaction with other
individuals as in tournaments (see e.g., Conrads et al., 2014). How-
ever, in many settings, a group of individuals must reach a decision
jointly, e.g., decision-making by committees in economic, social, or
political organizations. In fact, there is growing evidence from con-
texts other than lying that groups often decide markedly differ-
ent than individuals (for surveys, see Charness and Sutter, 2012;
Kugler et al., 2012). On the one hand, groups are better at solving
cognitive tasks and act more selfishly (see e.g., Maciejovsky et al.,
2013; Bornstein et al., 2004; Falk and Szech, 2013). That suggests
that groups might be more willing to realize the potential mon-
etary gains from lying. On the other hand, there is evidence that
‘‘moral reminders’’ reduce dishonesty (Pruckner and Sausgruber,
2013). Hence, discussions within groups might lead them to lie
less. Taken together, it seems a priori unclearwhether lying ismore
prevalent in groups compared to individuals. Moreover, for the ly-
ing behavior of groups their gender compositionmightmatter (see
e.g., Dufwenberg and Muren, 2006, where gender composition af-
fects groups’ giving in a dictator game). Consequently, this paper
aims at providing insights on the unethical behavior of groups and
individuals, and the role of gender in this context. Gender compo-
sition is found to be particularly important under group decision-
making. In our view, this has interesting implications for the design
of decision-making (and monitoring) processes in organizations.
2. Experimental design
We extend the simple and widely used die rolling experiment
of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), where subjects decide
autonomously and anonymously about their (lying) behavior, to a
setting where decisions are made jointly in groups. We consider a
treatment G where randomly formed groups of two subjects need
to coordinate on both who rolls the die and on which realization
to declare. As a control treatment I , we replicate the setup of
decision-making by individuals as in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
(2013). Subjects were randomly assigned to treatments (and in
treatment G, to groups).
The experiment was conducted at the University of Regensburg
in June 2014. Participants were recruited through an introductory
undergraduate course in economics (economicsmajors andminors
and businessmajors).2 Subjectswere first asked to complete an un-
related questionnaire inside the lecture hall. They were instructed
(i) that their payoff for filling out the questionnaire would be ei-
ther 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 Euros, and (ii) that the exact amount would be
determined in a second phase of the experiment outside the lec-
ture hall, where they would receive further instructions. Wemade
it clear that payoffs would be completely independent from their
answers in the questionnaire, and that their behavior in the exper-
iment would remain anonymous.
The die rolling experiment was then played in paper–pencil
style in fifteen booths outside the lecture hall that ensured com-
plete privacy of decision-making. Subjects waited inside the lec-
ture hall at their seats, and were only allowed to proceed outside
whenbooths became vacant. Inside the booth, subjects found a fair,
six-sided die, a pen, instructions, an anonymous answer sheet (on
which the realization of the die roll was to be declared), and a re-
ceipt form for each subject. Translations of the instructions and the
1 For surveys on gender differences in a variety of economic contexts, see e.g.,
Eckel and Grossman (2008) and Croson and Gneezy (2009).
2 As a show-up fee, students who agreed to participate (which all did) received a
small bonus towards their final exam.answer sheet are included in the Supplementary Material. As each
booth contained one die and one answer sheet only, in treatmentG,
subjects had to make a joint declaration, and they were aware that
each of them would receive the declared payoff.3 Afterwards, sub-
jects proceeded to the cashier desk. They handed in the anony-
mous questionnaire(s) and the anonymous answer sheet, where
it was checked that the declared amounts coincided with those
on the receipt form(s). Then each subject went to privately collect
his/her payment. As in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), sub-
ject i’s payment (in Euros) πi, is related to the declared outcome
of the die roll r ∈ {1, . . . , 6} as follows: πi = r for all r ≤ 5 and
πi = 0 for r = 6. In total, there were 228 participants (124 female,
104 male) of which 108 (120) participated in treatment I (G). The
whole experiment took about 2 hours.
3. Results
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of payoffs in the two treat-
ments. In line with the previous literature, a sizeable amount of
lying also occurs in our setting. First, the average payoffs in treat-
ments G and I are 3.47 and 3.48, respectively. Hence, they virtu-
ally take the same value (3.51) as in the baseline (individualistic)
treatment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Both payoff dis-
tributions differ significantly from the uniform distribution that
would result under truthful reporting leading to an average payoff
of 2.50 (p < 0.001, two-sided one-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov
(KS) tests). These results are driven mainly by the high frequency
of reported 4’s and 5’s. Comparing our two treatments reveals that
– when considering all observations – their payoff distributions do
not differ significantly at conventional levels according to a two-
sided Mann–Whitney U (MWU) test.4 However, as shown next,
this result masks substantial gender differences. As displayed in
Fig. 1(a), in treatment I , the average payoff is somewhat higher
for male subjects (3.58) than for female subjects (3.40), and both
gender-specific payoff distributions differ significantly from the
uniform distribution (p < 0.001, two-sided one-sample KS tests).
Hence, females are somewhat less prone to lying than men, but
the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.477, two-sided
MWU test). Based on own calculations, this is again very similar
to the baseline treatment of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013),
where the respective gender-specific values are 3.60 and 3.37with
p = 0.133.
The (slight) tendency of females to lie less than males is,
however, amplified in treatment G, where we observe groups that
are either ‘‘female’’ (only females), ‘‘male’’ (onlymales), or ‘‘mixed’’
(one female, one male). As illustrated in Fig. 1(b), compared to
treatment I , the average payoff of female groups decreases (to
2.74), while the average payoff ofmale andmixed groups increases
(to 4.00 and 3.71, respectively). Payoffs of female groups are
significantly lower than payoffs of male groups or mixed groups
(pair-wise two-sided MWU tests with p = 0.045 and p = 0.059,
respectively). The payoffs of male groups and mixed groups are
not significantly different from each other (two-sided MWU test,
p = 0.497). A Jonckheere–Terpstra test indicates that the extent of
lying is lowest for female groups followed by female individuals,
male individuals, and male groups (p = 0.026, two-sided). In
fact, while the payoff distributions of both male groups and mixed
groups differ significantly from the uniform distribution, which
3 As participants still had to read the instructions in the booth, they did not need
to worry that the time they spent there might be indicative of lying.
4 Chytilova and Korbel (2014) conduct an artefactual field experiment on lying
with children and adolescents at a high school, where participants were paid
in sweets. Their three-person groups obtain a somewhat higher payoff than
individuals (3.28 and 2.93, respectively).
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Summary of payoffs.
Treatment n π πi = 0 πi = 1 πi = 2 πi = 3 πi = 4 πi = 5
I (all individuals) 108 3.48 0.08−− 0.06−−− 0.09−− 0.19 0.28+++ 0.31+++
I (females only) 58 3.40 0.05−− 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.31+++
I (males only) 50 3.58 0.10 0.00−−− 0.10 0.14 0.34++ 0.32+++
G (all groups) 60 3.47 0.05−− 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.37+++
G (female groups only) 19 2.74 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.21
G (male groups only) 13 4.00 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.54+++
G (mixed groups only) 28 3.71 0.00−−− 0.11 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.39+++
Note: n and π indicate the number of observations and the average payoff, respectively. A minus (plus) sign displays the significance of a two-sided binomial test indicating
that the observed relative frequency is smaller (larger) than 16 : − (+) = 10%-level, −− (++) = 5%-level, −−− (+++) = 1%-level.(a) Treatment I . (b) Treatment G.
Fig. 1. Average payoffs. The dotted line indicates a payoff of 2.50, which would obtain on average under truthful reporting.Fig. 2. Frequencies of 4’s (black color) and 5’s (white color) by gender and treatment.would obtain under truthful reporting (two-sided one-sample KS
tests, each with p = 0.001), this is not the case for female groups
(p = 0.311). That is, in contrast to individuals (either female or
male), male groups, or mixed groups, one cannot reject that there
is no lying in female groups.
There are also interesting gender differenceswith respect to the
extent of lying, which we study by looking at the relative frequen-
cies of 4’s and 5’s.5 First, we compare the behavior of male indi-
viduals and male groups, where similar fractions report either 4
5 In principle, subjects might also lie to their own disadvantage. However, at
an aggregate level, for πi ≤ 3 none of the frequencies reported in Table 1 are
significantly above the truth-telling benchmark 1/6.or 5 (0.66 and 0.69, respectively). However, as illustrated by Fig. 2,
the fractions ofmale individuals who report 4 respectively 5 are al-
most identical. In contrast,male groupsmore often report 5 (in 54%
of cases) than 4 (in 15% of cases), where this difference is signifi-
cant at the 10%-level of a one-sided binomial test that presumes
that 4 and 5 occur with equal probability (p = 0.0898). Second,
from comparing female individuals and female groups a different
picture emerges. From Fig. 2, if anything, female groups are less
likely to report 5’s than female individuals (and in treatment I (G)
one cannot reject that 4’s and 5’s are reported by equal fractions of
female individuals (female groups)). Finally, mixed groups seem to
be more similar to male groups than to female groups, as there are
more 5’s than 4’s in mixed groups (where the p-value of a respec-
tive one-sided binomial test is, however, only 0.1662).
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Many important economic, social, or political decisions are
taken by groups rather than individuals. We investigate how gen-
der affects unethical behavior in the form of lying. In line with the
previous literature, we find no clear evidence for gender differ-
ences under individual decision-making on lying. In contrast, in the
case of group decision-making, more pronounced gender effects
arise; resulting inmore (less) aggregate unethical behavior inmale
(female) groups. Moreover, male groups seem to have a greater
tendency towards exploiting the full gains from lying (i.e., secur-
ing the maximum payoff of 5) than female groups. Finally, mixed
groups with equal shares of males and females behave similarly
to male groups. Hence, from the viewpoint of organizational de-
sign, our results suggest that in contexts where unethical behavior
might be an issue, designersmightwant to pay particular attention
to decisions that are taken by purely male (or male-dominated)
groups.
In future research, it would be interesting to study in more
detail the forces underlying our results. In this respect, it is well
known from other experimental settings that culture and cultural
context might be important factors (see e.g., Roth et al., 1991; Cox
et al., 1991; Herrmann et al., 2008). Cultural context might also
be of relevance in our context of unethical behavior, and at least
the following two channels might be at work: First, in the light
of the discussion in Section 1, culture might influence how groups
reach joint decisions as compared to individuals. For example, cul-
ture might affect how much group members are concerned with
their ‘‘image’’ relative to the potential gains from acting dishon-
estly. Second, also gender differences in behavior might be driven
by cultural context. Again, such effects have already been docu-
mented in other settings (see e.g., Finucane et al., 2000; Gneezy
et al., 2009), and they might also be relevant in the context of un-
ethical behavior.
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Appendix. Experimental instructions
Supplementary Material: Instructions and Answer Sheet
As Supplementary Material, we provide translated versions
of the instructions (Appendix A.1) and the answer sheet (Ap-
pendix A.2) provided inside the booths for treatment I. In square
brackets, we state the respective adjustments in the text for the
two treatments I andG. The original versions (in German) are avail-
able upon request.
To avoid waiting lines at the cashier desks, we had two of them
marked with green and red signs, respectively. We used otherwise
identical, randomly allocated answer sheets and receipt forms in
these colors (in equal proportions) and asked subjects to go to the
corresponding color-coded cashier desk after they had completed
the experiment.
A.1. Instructions
Please read the entire instructions first before you roll the die!
For participating in this experiment [G: each of] youwill receive
a payoff.For organizational reasons, the color of your documents deter-
mines at which cashier desk you will receive your payoff: If your
documents are in red, [G: both of] you may go to the red cashier
desk after finishing the experiment. If they are in green, then [G:
both of] you may go to the green cashier desk after finishing the
experiment.
The payoff that [G: each of] you will receive will be determined
by rolling a die:
Outcome of die roll 1 2 3 4 5 6
Payoff in Euros 1 2 3 4 5 0
[I: Please roll the die in front of you once.] [G: Please agree upon
who of you will roll the die in front of you once.] After that, please
circle the outcome of the die roll and the related payoff on the
answer sheet. You are free to roll the die more than once, but only
the first roll is relevant for your payoff.
In a next step, we ask [G: each of] you to fill out and sign your
receipt form (name and payoff) in line with your entry on the
answer sheet.
[G: Together] please submit all documents ([I: questionnaire,
answer sheet, receipt] [G: both questionnaires, answer sheet,
receipts]) at the respective cashier desk. [G: Each of] you will
receive [I: your] [G: his/her] payoff there.
If you have any questions, please contact a member of the support
team. If not, please roll the die now.
Thank you for your participation!
A.2. Answer sheet
Please circle the combination of the outcome of the die roll and
the corresponding payoff:
Outcome of die roll 1 2 3 4 5 6
Payoff in Euros 1 2 3 4 5 0
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